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ii. 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
§76-1-104. Utah Code Ann, (1953 as amended): 
76-1-104, Purposes and principles of construction. The 
provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance 
with these general purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses; 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which 
constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is 
without fault from condemnation as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the 
seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition or 
differences in rehabilitation possibilities among 
individual offenders. 
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons 
accused or convicted of offenses. 
§76-3-204 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended): 
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction—Term of imprisonment.— 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be 
sentenced to imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor/ for a term not 
exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding six months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding ninety days. 
U.S. Constitution Amendment V: 
AMENDMENT V 
. . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . 
iii. 
Utah Constitution at I, §12: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have 
a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not 
be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall 
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
iv. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann, 
§78-2a-3(2)(e) whereby a defendant in a district court criminal 
action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final 
judgment of conviction of any crime other than a first degree or 
capital felony. In this case, Appellant was convicted by a jury of 
Theft by Extortion, a Class A Misdemeanor. The Honorable Richard 
Moffat, Judge,Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction. (See 
Addendum A) 
v. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Was Appellant entitled to receive credit for time served 
while awaiting trial and sentencing where Appellant was held without 
bail and subsequently sentenced to serve the maximum sentence 
allowed by statute in addition to the nine month period of 
presentence incarceration? 
vi. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
GUIDO ALVILLAR, : Case No. 870035-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against 
Guido Alvillar for Theft by Extortion, a Class A Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-406 (1953 as amended). A jury 
found Appellant guilty on December 1, 1986 in the Third District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Richard H. Moffat, presiding. The trial court sentenced Mr. 
Alvillar on December 31, 1986 to the maximum term of one year at the 
Salt Lake County Jail or the Utah State Prison without giving Mr. 
Alvillar credit for the nine month period of presentence 
incarceration which he served. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A jury convicted Mr. Alvillar of Theft by Extortion, a 
Class A misdemeanor, for an incident which occurred on or about 
March 31, 1986 (T. 3). At the time the incident occurred, Mr. 
Alvillar was on parole from the Utah State Prison (T. 5). 
From the date of the incident until the date of sentencing 
nine months later, Mr. Alvillar was held without bail at the Utah 
State Prison (T. 5). He was held on the charges in this case and on 
a parole hold based on a single allegation that the criminal conduct 
charged in the present case constituted a violation of his parole 
(T. 7). Mr, Alvillar did not appear before the Board of Pardons for 
a revocation hearing during this nine month period (R. 127). At the 
sentencing hearing. Judge Moffat sentenced Mr. Alvillar to the 
maximum statutorily allowable jail term of twelve months. Mr. 
Alvillar was not given credit for the nine month presentence time 
served (T. 13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Where Appellant was held without bail for nine months on 
the charges involved in the present case and the only other hold was 
a parole hold based on a single allegation involving the conduct 
charged in this case, the trial court erred in imposing the maximum 
statutory sentence and not giving appellant credit for the 
presentence time served. Such sentence violated Mr. Alvillar's 
rights against multiple punishment as guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. ALVILLARfS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE 
VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS SENTENCED TO THE MAXIMUM 
TERM OF INCARCERATION WITHOUT RECEIVING 
CREDIT FOR PRESENTENCE INCARCERATION. 
Mr. Alvillar contends that the trial court's sentence, 
which failed to credit the period of presentence incarceration, 
constitutes double punishment for the same offense and therefore 
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violates his constitutional rights. The double jeopardy clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I 
§12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah prohibit multiple 
punishment for the same offense. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-204 (1953 as 
amended) establishes that a person who has been convicted of a Class 
A misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding one year. Because Mr. Alvillar's nine month presentence 
incarceration resulted from his alleged commission of theft by 
extortion this nine month period of incarceration constitutes 
punishment for that misdemeanor. The twelve month sentence imposed 
by the court, when added to the time already served by Mr. Alvillar/ 
exceeds the maximum allowable sentence. Consequently, that sentence 
violates the Constitutional prohibition against multiple punishment 
for the same offense. 
In Pearce v. North Carolina, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) the United 
States Supreme Court established that the imposition of two prison 
terms for the same crime violates the constitutional guarantee 
against multiple punishments as provided by the Fifth Amendment 
double jeopardy clause. In Pearce, the defendant had been convicted 
of assault with intent to commit rape and was sentenced to prison 
for twelve to fifteen years. Several years later, the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina reversed the conviction. Pearce was retried, 
convicted and sentenced to an eight year prison term which, when 
added to the time he had already spent in prison, amounted to a 
longer sentence than originally imposed. The United States Supreme 
Court held that the Fifth Amendment prohibition against multiple 
punishments for the same offense "absolutely requires that 
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punishment already enacted must be fully credited in imposing 
sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense." Id. at 
718-719. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a 
defendant should be granted credit for pretrial time served in State 
v. Winning/ 531 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1975). In that case, the defendant 
was unable to post bail and spent seventy days in jail prior to 
pleading guilty to a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced 
the defendant to serve one year in jail/ the statutory maximum for a 
Class A misdemeanor, and did not give him credit for the period of 
pretrial incarceration. The Utah Supreme Court refused defendant's 
request that he be granted credit for the seventy days pretrial 
incarceration. The refusal to grant credit was based on the Utah 
Supreme Court's view that the Pearce double jeopardy rationale was 
inapplicable to the fact situation in Winning. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated "(i)n the case before usf the defendant is awaiting 
trial and disposition of his case rather than undergoing 
punishment" State v. Winning, supra/ at 1303. By so holding, the 
Utah Supreme Court based its decision on the view that pretrial 
inceration is not punishment. The holding in Winning goes against 
the clear weight of authority and should be overruled. 
In the case of State of Utah v. Danny Richards/ Case No. 
20580/ currently on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court/ Mr. Richards 
was unable to post bond and served seventy five days prior to being 
convicted of a Class B misdemeanor. The judge sentenced Mr. 
Richards to serve six months jail, the statutory maximum for a Class 
B Misdemeanor/ without giving him credit for the pretrial time he 
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had served. The Utah Supreme Court granted Mr. Richards' Petition 
for Certificate of Probable Cause and Motion to Stay any sentence in 
excess of six months , and Mr. Richards was released from jail six 
months after his initial arrest and incarceration (See State v. 
Richards/ Case No. 20580, Appellant's Brief at p. 2). 
In his brief, Richards asked the Utah Supreme Court to 
overturn its holding in Winning (State v. Richards, Supreme Court 
Case No. 20580, Appellant's Brief at 10). In response, the State 
agreed that assuming the trial court had jurisdiction to give credit 
for presentence detention in misdemeanor cases, the Utah Supreme 
Court should overrule its holding in State v. Winning, where a 
misdemeanant receives the maximum sentence and his presentence 
detention is due solely to his indigency. (See State v. Richards, 
Case No. 20580, Respondent's Brief at 7-9). 
Several state and federal courts have held that pretrial 
incarceration constitutes punishment for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
In the North Carolina case of Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416 
(D.C.N.C. 1971) a defendant, like Mr. Alvillar, was incarcerated 
prior to trial and was later given the statutory maximum sentence. 
The District Court applied the Pearce rationale and held that: 
Culp shall be given credit for time spent in 
custody prior to commitment where he has been 
given a maximum sentence. Pre-trial detention is 
nothing less than punishment. An unconvicted 
accused who is not allowed or cannot raise bail 
is deprived of his liberty. (emphasis added) 
Id. at 419. See also Reanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash 1974); 
State v. Phelan, 471 P.2d 1212 (Wash. 1983). These cases hold that 
pretrial incarceration constitutes punishment for Fifth Amendment 
purposes. 
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Reanier v. Smith/ 517 P.2d 949 (Wash. 1974) involved the 
consolidated applications for writs of habeas corpus of four 
defendants who were incarcerated in the state penitentiary. All 
four sought credit against their prison sentences for pretrial 
detention. The Court held that all of the defendants/ one of whom 
was confined to the state hospital prior to sentencing, two of whom 
were unable to post bail/ and one of whom was denied bail because of 
the nature of the charge, were entitled to credit on their terms for 
time served in detention prior to trial. In so holding the 
Washington Supreme Court stated: 
Fundamental fairness and the avoidance of 
discrimination and possible multiple punishment 
dictate that an accused person, unable to or 
precluded from posting bail or otherwise 
procuring his release from confinement prior to 
trial should, upon conviction and commitment to a 
state penal facility/ be credited. . . with all 
time served in detention prior to trial and 
sentence. (emphasis added) 
JCd. at 951. 
In the interest of justice and fairness/ credit for 
presentence incarceration should be granted in every case in which a 
person is incarcerated prior to his conviction and sentencing 
because of an inability to post bail whether the inability is due to 
indigency/ the nature of the charge, or a refusal to set bail due to 
parole status. A person who is incarcerated pending trial may be 
subjected to indefinite and lengthy periods of detention caused by 
delays in the court calendar, scheduling difficulties and 
continuances. An incarcerated person should not be penalized for 
those delays. Upon conviction, that person should be credited with 
all of the presentence time served on the charge. 
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One of the general purposes of the criminal code is to 
"(p)revent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or 
convicted of offenses," Utah Code Ann. §76-1-404 (4) (1953 as 
amended). To require any person, simply because he is a parolee, to 
serve more time in jail than a non-parolee charged with the same 
offense and to not give credit for that time served is precisely the 
type of arbitrary and oppressive treatment condemned by this 
section. In the case at hand, the trial court arbitrarily enhanced 
the punishment for an offense solely on the basis of Mr. Alvillar's 
status as a parolee. This practice is discriminatory and 
fundamentally unfair. 
The sentence imposed on Mr. Alvillar was not only unfair 
but was also unlawful. The trial judge abused his discretion by 
sentencing Mr.Alvillar to the maximum sentence allowed by law 
without giving him credit for presentence time served. In 
jurisdictions where the trial judge has discretion to grant or deny 
credit for time served in presentence detention, the Court 
nevertheless may not impose a sentence which will result in more 
jail time than that authorized by law. Hedge v. State, 696 P.2d 51 
(Wyo. 1985). Utah Code Ann. §76-3-204 establishes twelve months 
imprisonment as the maximum sentence allowed for a Class A 
Misdemeanor. Since Mr. Alvillar had served nine months prior to 
sentencing, imposition of the maximum twelve month sentence exceeded 
that allowed by law and constituted an abuse of discretion. 
In addition to case law, other authority supports Mr. 
Alvillar's position that imposition of the maximum allowable 
sentence without credit for time already served is unlawful. The 
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American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Sentencing 
Alternatives and Procedures/ Standard 18-4.7 (Approved Draft 1968, 
1982 Supp.) states: 
a) Credit against the maximum term . . . should 
be given to a defendant for all time spent in 
custody as a result of the criminal charge for 
which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result 
of the conduct on which such a charge is based. 
This should specifically include credit for time 
spent in custody prior to trial, (emphasis added). 
(Addendum B). 
This ABA standard is applicable to the case at hand. Mr. 
Alvillar was held on the charges in this case and the parole hold, 
both of which resulted from the conduct on which the misdemeanor was 
based. Pursuant to ABA Standard 18-4.7 Mr. Alvillar should be 
credited with pre-sentence time served. 
Additional non-case law support comes from the Model Penal 
Code §7.09(1)(Proposed Official Draft 1962) which provides that when 
an individual is incarcerated prior to trial and subsequently 
sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence he is entitled to full 
credit for his pretrial incarceration (Addendum C). 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, and any and all 
reasons set forth at oral argument, if any there be, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this court vacate his sentence and remand 
the case to the Third District Court with an order to the District 
Court directing it to correct its illegal sentence and give Mr. 
Alvillar credit for the nine months presentence incarceration he 
served on this case. 
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Respectfully submitted this -2% day of May, 1987. 
^NU^ C • (ikN 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that four copies of the-
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
7< 84114, this day of May, 1987. 
Cfiktf 
DELIVERED by, 
May, 1987. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Afe^rnei' for Appellant 
this J^g^ day of 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILMED 
' ' « " UN ULERK'S OFI 
Salt Lake County, Ut< 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH H Dixon 
By. 
JAN7/6 1987 
y. Cierk 3rd Qisi 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
Aval 
6 ?5P) 
Defendant. 
n^^fitv < 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) TO 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
Case No. 
Count No. 
r.e 86- 6Q5 
JL~ 
Honorable j£ssLn/\A f l . •JfYiMa¥ 
Clerk 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Date 
" iflg£g"™ 
f>y\A AAAriAAJ 
£*TAh«A 31* l ^ £ 6 
D The motion of. . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being/no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by Bla jury; Dthe court; • plea of guilty; • plea 
of no contest; of the offense of ~T)wi f Ifid^ e x V ) > r f i r ? U ; 
a class A misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentenceand represented by 
J A COJSC>\ ^ f > y ^ - ^ L J L , r and the State being represented by C%ve<X \&LX)tO , is 
now adjudged guilty of the above offense, ° 
fSris now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
(M of 13, months; 
Dyrfnd ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
w and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to M 
APPH ¥ro, - f w , nkar .K <q,AAd VaO/J.2, n\% iVw, 
la<?/ cU^amtKfr^ vu 
VI N 
* 
& 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
Dyupon motion of • State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) _ . - are hereby dismissed. 
Jb AVU. ab 4Vw • LHak ^kdba, V"ris 
D Defenaant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this 
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Gr Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and 
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Gr Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By . / *L/H^ rTT / ?J Page 
•Deputy Clerk 
~'-L«-L 
OGQll*-
(White—Court) (Green—Judge) (Yellow—Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink—Defense) (Goldenrod—State) 
ADDENDUM B 
Standard 18*4.7. Credit for pretrial confinement 
(a) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term 
should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody as a 
result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is im-
' posed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. 
This should specifically include credit for time spent in custody 
prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the resolu-
tion of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which 
the defendant has been committed. 
(b) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term 
should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody under 
15. Sftpnnaily ALI. MOOIL PIHAL Coof §305.24 and comment at 129-134 (Tent. Draft 
No. 5. 1956). 
16. Cooper v. Lockhart. 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973); Kane v. Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369 
(4th Gr. 1970). Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C 1974); Norris v. Georgia, 357 
F. Supp. 1200 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Lawrence v. Blackweil. 298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ca. 1969). 
17. Stf ABA. turn note 8. §3.5(c) (restricting use of detainers in classification decisions). 
18 • 307 
18-4.7 Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 
\ a prior sentence if the defendant is later reprosecuted and resen-
tenced for the same offense or for another offense based on the 
same conduct In the case of such a reprosecution, this should 
- include credit in accordance with paragraph (a) for all time spent 
in custody as a result of both the original charge and any subse-
quent charge for the same offense or for another offense based on 
the same conduct 
(c) If a defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of 
the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or collateral at-
tack, credit against the maximum term and any minimum term of 
the remaining sentences should be given for all time served since 
the commission of the offenses on which the sentences were 
based. 
(d) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prose-
cuted on another charge growing out of conduct which occurred 
prior to arrest, credit against the maximum term and any minimum 
term of any sentence resulting from such prosecution should be 
given for all time spent in custody under the former charge which 
has not been credited against another sentence. 
(e) To avoid ambiguities, the award of credit for pretrial incarcer-
ation should be automatic and mechanical, and affirmative action 
by the sentencing court should be unnecessary. A procedure con-
sistent with this principle is specified in standard 18-6A 
(f) The policies of sentencing authorities and those of other 
agencies empowered to determine the date oi actual release 
should be carefully coordinated in the area of sentencing credit to 
achieve consistency of application and the abolition of any dis-
tinction between pretrial and posttrial confinement In particular, 
where the agency administering early release employs guidelines 
to determine the presumptive date of such release, credit for pre-
' trial confinement should dso be given against such presumptive 
term. To the extent that full integration of policies respecting 
sentencing credit is not achieved, the sentencing court should 
make corresponding adjustments in the sentence it imposes to 
ensure that the defendant who is confined before trial receives 
full credit therefor. 
(g) These standards do not address the question of whether 
credit should be given against the maximum term for good conduct 
within the correctional institution or for compliance with institu-
tional rules. 
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Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 18-4.7 
History of Standard 
This is original standard 3.6. There are only stylistic changes, except 
that paragraph (f) addresses the new context of parole guidelines and 
requires the sentencing court to ascertain that consideration similar to 
that required here be required of parole authorities, and if it is not, that 
compensating adjustments be made in the sentence imposed. 
Related Standards 
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 10-5.12, 18-6.8 
AU, Model Penal Code §7.09 
NAC, Corrections 5.8 
NCCUSL, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act §3-502 
Commentary 
Background 
Under a variety of circumstances, time spent in custody as a result of 
criminal conduct does not count against the sentence imposed. This may 
occur because no statute exists in the jurisdiction granting a credit for 
such presentence confinement,1 because the statute is narrowly drafted 
and excludes some types of incarceration,2 because the court is pre-
1. A1974 ABA survey found that forty-one jurisdictions provide at least partial credit 
against the sentence for time spent in jail prior to sentencing; another nine jurisdictions 
made the decision discretionary with the trial judge; one state specifically forbade credit; 
and another had "no law on the matter." See ABA SPECIAL COMMISSION ON COIIICTIONAI. 
FACUTIIS AND SERVICES, SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PXACTKI 15 (1974). Federal law 
provides a comprehensive credit. See IS U.S.G §3568 (1976). 
2. Statutes frequently provide that a sentence "shall commence to run upon arrival at 
the prison" or shall be for a term of years "in the state penitentiary." See State v. Kennedy, 
106 Ariz. 190.472 P.2d 59 (1970); Ex parte Cofield. 42 Ala. App. 344.164 So. 2d 716 (1964). 
Other statutes can be read not to give a credit for time spent in a mental hospital for 
observation or study prior to sentencing. An ABA survey found only thirty-two statutes 
that expressly awarded credit for such incarceration in a mental hospital. SENTENCING 
COMPUTATION LAWS AND PtAcncx, supra note 2, at 15. For the constitutional arguments that 
such a limited crediting system offends due process and equal protection concepts, see 
Schornhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23 HASTINGS L. J. 
1041 (1972); Stacy, Constitutional Right to Sentence Credit for Pre- Trial Incarceration, 41 U. CIN. L 
Riv. 523 (1972); Comment, Prisoners Rights and Eaual Protection, 20 AM. U.L Riv. 482 (1970-
1971). See also Parker v. Esteile, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
Special complications arise in the multijurisdictional context. One decision has denied 
18 • 309 
: 18-4.7 Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 
suxned under local law to have taken such confinement into considera-
tion as long as the sentence imposed plus the period of pretrial confine-
ment did not exceed the maximum authorized sentence,3 or because the 
recognized constitutional case law in the circuit requires a credit for 
pretrial confinement only where the crime is a "bailable" one.4 What-
ever the reason, there is today only partial recognition of the principle 
endorsed here that distinctions between pretrial and posttrial confine-
ment should be irrelevant 
It is the purpose of this standard to end such technical distinctions by 
granting a comprehensive credit that treats all periods of confinement 
attributable to the underlying criminal transaction as equivalent, no 
matter what label is attached to such incarceration. To this end, para-
graph (a) requires the credit to be offset against both the minimum and 
maximum terms imposed, and paragraph (f) seeks to integrate the poli-
cies of sentencing and parole authorities so that such confinement will 
similarly reduce any presumptive guideline term used by parole au-
thorities. 
There are several reasons for this standard's attempt to standardize 
practices with respect to sentencing credits. First, and most common, is 
that pretrial detention is related to indigency. Thus, to ignore the pre-
trial incarceration of the indigent offender is to permit discrimination 
based on economic status, which, regardless of the extensive debate 
a credit against a federal sentence for time spent in state custody pending a thai under 
a federal detainer issued with respect to the same federal conviction. See Bruss v. Harris, 
479 F.2d 392 (10th Or. 1973). For criticism of this denial, see Note, Bruss v. Harris: No 
Fedent Credit for Time Spent in State Custody — The Effect of a Federal Detainer. 1973 UTAH L RSV. 
473. Geariy such time is causally related to the federal conviction, but the court held 
that the aedit had been exhausted by applying it against the concurrent state sentence. 
See note 24 infra. In general, federal courts now give a aedit for time spent in a state 
prison under a federal detainer. See O'Connor v. Attorney General, 470 F.2d 732 (5th 
Gr. 1972). 
3. Compare Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C Gr. 1966); Davis v. Willingham, 
415 F.2d 344 (10th Gr. 1969); Holt v. United States, 422 FJd 522 (7th Gr. 1970); Sute 
v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Jenkins v. Warden, 4 Md. App. 629, 244 
A.2d 468 (1966); Miles v. State, 214 So. 2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966). More recent 
cases refusing to adopt such a presumption are discussed at note 8 infra. 
4. See. e.g.. Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d 1068 (5th Gr. 1972); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 
1231 (5th Gr. 1976). Although it can be argued that there is no invidious discrimination 
involved where aedit is denied for a nonbailable offense, since the rich and the poor are 
treated alike, commentators have pointed out that the case for "jail time" credits rests on 
other constitutional foundations besides that of equal protection. See Comment, Credit for 
Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing. 121 U. PA. L Riv. 1148 (1973). 
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over its constitutionality, is unwise and unjust Second, the least drastic 
means principle also has an application in this context "Jail time" serves 
most recognized penological goals equally well as does prison time, and 
in fact is generally understood to represent a qualitatively harsher form 
of confinement than prison custody. To fail to credit it thus results in 
confinement in excess of the minimum necessary to realize deterrent, 
incapacitative, or retributive purposes. A third argument arises when 
the issue is whether custody under a prior invalid conviction should be 
credited. In principle, the government should have at least a moral 
obligation to recompense the offender for time wrongfully served under 
an invalid conviction, and it can only make restitution by permitting 
such a credit.5 Additionally, to the extent that credit is not awarded 
comprehensively for all forms of custody relating to the criminal charge 
for which the sentence is imposed, an unfortunate opportunity for 
abuse arises. The possibility cannot be wholly ignored that atypical 
forms of presentence confinement (such as detention in a psychiatric 
institution for observation or treatment) might be themselves used as 
a punishment in order ''to manipulate time factors in sentencing/'6 
Finally, credit not given for confinement awaiting appeal may result in 
a chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal the conviction.7 
Constitutional Developments 
Since the first edition, the most important developments concerning 
sentence credits involve the constitutional claim that denial of credit for 
jail time violates the equal protection clause. A number of circuit court 
decisions have accepted this argument,8 although some decisions have 
5. A similar position was taken by the National Advisory Commission. See NAC. 
CORRECTIONS, commentary at 171. In most situations such a credit will also be constitution* 
ally required by North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
6. L FARMER. OBSERVATION AND STUDY 4 (1977). See also Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th 
Ox.), cert, denied 421 U.S. 963 (1974). 
7. Statutes denying credit pending appeal are collected in Whalen, Resentence Without 
Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws. 35 MINN. L REV. 239, 246 n.40 (1951). 
Contemporary statutes do not expressly deny credit for time pending appeal, but by 
delaying the sentence's commencement until the arrival of the prisoner at the state prison. 
they may make possible substantially the same outcome. See SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAKS 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 19. G. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). 
8. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 
(1971) (memorandum), remanding to United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037,1039-1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Ham v. North Carolina, 471 
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limited this rule to bailable offenses. The rationale for the latter distinc-
tion is that the rich and the poor alike are incarcerated pending trial for 
. nonbailabie offenses and thus no discrimination results when credit for 
such jail time is denied.9 Neither these standards nor the Pretrial Release 
standards approve of this distinction. In essence, such a distinction 
legitimizes preventive detention based only on the category of the 
offense. Preventive confinement is subject to attack on a variety of other 
constitutional theories,10 and its impact should be minimized by re-
compensing the defendant through a credit against the sentence. Failure 
to do so also creates often unjustified disparities between offenders 
convicted of bailable and nonbailabie offenses, since the difference in 
the gravity of the respective offenses committed by these two classes 
may be modest in comparison with the difference in treatment they 
thereby receive. 
An even more significant limitation on the development of a compre-
hensive credit for presentence custody is the rule followed in several 
circuits that, if the actual sentence imposed plus the period of presen-
tence custody did not exceed the statutory maximum, then a presump-
tion arises that the court gave credit for the presentence time.11 Such a 
presumption may occasionally conform with the court's actual intent, 
but it is at least equally possible that the court simply overlooked the 
presentence custody already served or at least failed to give this ques-
tion the serious attention it warrants. In any event, recent decisions have 
refused to accept this line of reasoning and have held that such a 
presumption may not be used to overcome what the courts saw as a 
constitutional right.12 These standards have always agreed with this 
latter position and so provide in standard 18-6.8 for the automatic 
crediting of presentence custody without any inquiry into the court's 
probable intent. 
The position of the Supreme Court on the constitutional status of jail 
time credit is less certain. In McClnnis v. Roysler, the Court upheld a New 
F.2d 406 (4th Gr. 1973); Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Or. 1971); Wright v. 
Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970); Mohr v. Jordan, 370 F. Supp. 1149 
(D. Md. 1974); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C 1971); White v. Cilligan, 351 
F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1972). 
9. See note 4 supra. 
10. See Comment, supra note 4. See also commentary to standard 18-3.2. 
11. See cases collected zt note 3 supra. 
12. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Faye v. Cray, 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 
1976); Parker v. EsteUe, 498 F.2d 625 (Sth Cir.), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1974). 
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York statute that denied good time credit to state prisoners for time 
spent in presentence custody in county jails.13 In so doing, it noted that 
since the good time credit system was designed to reflect a prisoner's 
performance in prison rehabilitation programs, a rational basis existed 
for its denial to presentence custody in county jails that lacked equiva-
lent rehabilitative facilities. 
Distinctions, of course, exist between good time and jail time credits. 
The latter is a far less important right to the offender because the 
offender is generally parole eligible by the point such credits would 
require release, and the majority of offenders are released through the 
parole process rather than by the expiration of the statutory maximum 
less good time credits. In contrast to the issue of jail time that reduces 
the minimum period all offenders must serve, good time generally only 
becomes applicable if, after an individualized assessment by the parole 
agency, the offender has been deemed sufficiently culpable or dangerous 
on his or her own merits to require further confinement. Even in this 
special context of good time credits, subsequent decisions have distin-
guished McGinnis on the grounds that the case turned on the unique 
character of the New York statute with its special emphasis on rehabili-
tation.14 An earlier memorandum decision by the Court at least suggests 
that where credit against the minimum term is at issue the Court will 
be less prepared to accept references to the statutory purposes of 
confinement as a permissible basis on which to treat more harshly those 
unable to make bail.15 The majority of commentators have also seen 
McGinnis as limited in its application and have argued that a constitu-
tional right to credit for presentence custody now exists.16 
Statutory Developments 
Statutory developments since the first edition still show the same 
diversity of approaches with respect to sentencing credits. A 1974 ABA 
13. 410 U.S. 263 (1973). But see Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th Gr. 1972), afd- en bane. 
470 F.2d 11S2 (1973). 
14. Set. e.g.. Berger, Eaual Protection and Criminal Sentencing; Legal and Policy Considerations. 71 
Nw. U.L Riv. 29 (1976); Note, Constitutional lam — Sentencing — Withholding Good Time Credit 
from Prisoners Awaiting Appeal. 51 TEX. L Rfv. 348 (1973); Note, Sentence Crediting for the State 
Criminal Defendant — A Constitutional Retirement. 34 OHIO ST. LJ. 586, 593 n.35 (1973). 
15. Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971); for the decision after remand, see 
United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Gr . 1971). 
16. See sources cited at notes 12 St 14 supra. 
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survey found that forty-one jurisdictions provided at least partial credit 
against the sentence for time spent in jail before sentencing,17 nine made 
the decision discretionary with the trial judge, and only one specifically 
forbade such credit.18 Some thirty-two states also gave explicit credit for 
time spent in a mental hospital, three others did so by administrative 
practice, and six declined to give such credit.19 The computation of the 
credit also varies among jurisdictions. Older statutes still provide that 
the sentence commences "upon arrival at the prison," and by so focus-
ing on time spent at a specific institution they have been narrowly 
interpreted to deny all credits.20 Unfortunately, many jurisdictions that 
do grant credit in some form for jail time fail to specify procedures for 
its determination or award. Thus, it is judicial case law that establishes 
the operative presumption, often in a. way that narrows the statutory 
grant.21 
Detention Prior to Service of Sentence 
The position taken in paragraphs (a) and (b) is codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§3568 and has been similarly endorsed by the Brown Commission22 and 
the National Advisory Commission.23 This consensus obviates further 
explanation of why denial of credit for presentence custody is unfair. 
Current federal law, however, does not grant credit for custody under 
a different and unrelated charge on which a defendant is arrested and 
confined but not convicted, although such confinement occurs after the 
commission of the crime for which the sentence was imposed. Para-
graph (d) recommends that credit also be awarded in this situation as 
well, and the Brown Commission agrees.24 There are several reasons for 
17. SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 15. 
19. JUL 
20. Id. at 15-16. But see Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th O r . 1972), affi. en banc. 470 F.2d 
1182 (1973). 
21 . See. /./.. State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Jenkins v. Warden. 4 
Md. App. 629, 244 A.2d 468 (1968); Miles v. State, 214 So. 2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 
1968). 
22. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT §3205 
(1971). 
23. N A C CORRECTIONS 5.8; see also NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT 
§3-502. 
24. FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, §3205(3); see also NCCUSL. MODEL SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS ACT § 3 - 5 0 2 ( C ) . Both the Brown Commission and the Model Sentencing and 
Corrections Act agree, however, that the offender should "not receive credit for the same 
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this recommendation. In some instances, the unrelated charge that went 
unprosecuted may have served as a kind of holding category, while the 
crime for which sentence was actually imposed may have been "the 
undisclosed basis for the first arrest/'25 Even if this is not the case, 
failure to credit the time served under the offense for which there was 
no conviction gives rise to an inequitable forfeiture by the offender. 
This also violates the least drastic means principle, since such time 
equally well serves any legitimate correctional purpose. Potentially, the 
offender is exposed to a label game under which confinement can in 
effect be enhanced depending on the characterization placed on some 
portion of the presentence custody. 
One limit on this recommendation should be made clear: time served 
prior to the commission of the instant offense should not be credited, 
even if wrongfully served, since this might permit an offender to "bank" 
time against a future offense. 
As a practical matter, the recommendation in paragraph (d) will sel-
dom interfere with the flexibility accorded sentencing authorities, but 
will instead provide assurance that they have given adequate attention 
to a relevant factor. The only instance where a mandatory credit for 
such "dead time" will legally limit the authority of the sentencing court 
will be when such time plus the sentence the court wishes to impose 
exceeds the statutory authorized maximum, and it is exactly in such 
instances where a forfeiture of the prior time spent incarcerated seems 
most inequitable.26 In other situations, the court will still have the 
time more than once/' NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND CotJtscnoNS ACT, comment to 
§3-502. These standards concur, and this is the intent underlying the final clause in 
paragraph (d), referring to time "which has not been credited against another sentence/' 
However, it should be noted that where multiple sentences are made to run concurrently, 
it is certainly not the intent of this standard to award the credit against one of two 
concurrent sentences and require its denial against the other. Given the tendency for the 
same criminal transaction to violate overlapping statutes {e.g., one proscribing mail fraud 
and the other wire fraud), such an absurd interpretation could frequently render the basic 
principle of this standard meaningless. But in other situations (such as where the second 
prosecution follows the expiration of the first sentence and the criminal conduct leading 
to the current sentence occurred prior to the arrest of the first charge), the legitimate 
interests of the defendant are amply protected by a single crediting. For a case illustrating 
the dangers of a doctrinaire approach to this single crediting rule, set Bruss v. Harris, 479 
F.2d 932 (10th Or. 1973) (credit for pretrial state confinement under a federal detainer 
denied where such time was credited against a state sentence concurrent with the federal 
sentence). 
25. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 22. comment to §3205. 
26. Cf. Tinin v. United States, 361 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1966); Short v. United States, 344 
F.2d 550, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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authority to exceed the recommended guideline range, although its 
explanation for such a departure will have to cite plausible factors. 
One other aspect of paragraph (a) deserves special emphasis. Oedit 
should be awarded in instances where special treatment is imposed, or 
special diagnosis required, as a result of the conduct underlying the 
criminal charge. The "pending sentence" language would clearly in-
clude, for example, any time an offender spends in a diagnostic facility 
for the purpose of having a report compiled under a provision like that 
suggested in standard 18-5.6. A narrower statutory credit might unfor-
tunately cause the diagnostic facility to be used as a means of extending 
short sentences. It is also intended that credit be required if a defendant 
is later convicted of an offense on die basis of conduct for which the 
defendant has already been committed. Many of the sex offender stat-
utes described in the commentary to standard 18-2.5 would permit the 
criminal prosecution to proceed and a normal sentence to be imposed 
after the defendant has been released from a "civil" commitment for the 
same conduct. While these standards by no means approve of such 
provisions, if they are to be used at all, further criminal proceedings 
should at least count the time the offender has been civilly restrained 
for the same underlying conduct. The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation 
Act of 1966 recognizes this principle by giving credit for any period of 
civil commitment for addiction against any criminal confinement based 
on the same conduct if criminal proceedings follow the civil commit-
ment.27 
Detention Under a Prior Invalid Sentence 
Paragraph (b) addresses the resentencing situation where a prior con-
viction or sentence has been held invalid. Historically, some cases once 
took the position that such confinement could be ignored since there 
was no legal sentence of which the law had to take note.2* The reductio 
adabsurdum consequences of this line of reasoning were effectively ridi-
culed in a classic statement in King v. United States: 
The Government's brief suggests, in the vein of The Mikado, that 
because the first sentence was void appellant "has served no sentence but 
has merely spent time in the penitentiary"; that since he should not have 
been imprisoned as he was, he was not imprisoned at all. . . . As other 
27. See 23 U.S.C §2903(d) (1976). 
28. See Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913). 
18 • 316 
ADDENDUM C 
§7.09 122 Model Penal Code 
Resubmitted to the Institute in Proposed Final Draft No. 1 and 
approved at the May 1961 meeting. 
In the first sentence of Subsection (1) the words "convicted of a 
felony or misdemeanor" have been added. 
For Commentary, see Tentative Draft No. 2, p. 56. 
Section 7.09. Credit for Time of Detention Prior to Sen-
tence; Credit for Imprisonment Under 
Earlier Sentence for the Same Crime. 
(1) When a defendant who is sentenced to imprison-
ment has previously been detained in any state or local cor-
rectional or other institution following his [conviction of] 
[arrest for] the crime for which such sentence is imposed, 
such period of detention following his [conviction] [arrest] 
shall be deducted from the maximum term, and from the 
minimum, if any, of such sentence. The officer having cus-
tody of the defendant shall furnish a certificate to the Court 
at the time of sentence, showing the length of such detention 
of the defendant prior to sentence in any state or local cor-
rectional or other institution, and the certificate shall be 
annexed to the official records of the defendant's commit-
ment. 
i 
(2) When a judgment of conviction is vacated and a 
new sentence is thereafter imposed upon the defendant for 
the same crime, the period of detention and imprisonment 
theretofore served shall be deducted from the maximum 
term, and from the minimum, if any, of the new sentence. 
The officer having custody of the defendant shall furnish a 
certificate to the Court at the time of sentence, showing 
the period of imprisonment served under the original sen-
tence, and the certificate shall be annexed to the official 
records of the defendant's new commitment. 
STATUS O t SECTION 
Presented to the Institute in Proposed Final Draft No. 1 and 
approved at the May 1961 meeting. 
A verbal change has been made in the title of the Section. 
